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Making Sense of Data: 
Objectivity and subjectivity, fact and value
Paul Standish
Abstract: Data can seem to be the very foundation of research, the sine qua non of enquiry 
into education. Yet this thought can be troubled by questions about the provenance of data or 
about how something comes to be constructed as data in the fi rst place. And most researchers 
face questions about what to do with data when it arrives—where, in the social sciences more 
than the physical sciences, results of tests rarely show conclusively what to do next, and where, in 
light of this, interpretation comes to the fore. Th e present essay discusses problems of objectivity 
and subjectivity, and of fact and value, as these arise in relation to these matters. Th e idea that 
the mind is more or less separate from the body and the idea that there is a realm of fact distinct 
from the realm of value in many respects laid the way for contemporary notions of objectivity and 
subjectivity, not least in the social sciences. Yet both are now widely discredited. Th e present dis-
cussion will illustrate the nature of the reappraisal that, in consequence, is needed. Th e argument 
that unfolds will help to reveal the need for a reorientation of education—in research, policy, and 
practice—such that the role and importance of the exercise of judgement is better understood. 
Th ere are implications here for research methods training and for the funding that facilitates 
responsible enquiry into education.
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PREAMBLE
Th is essay purports to discuss to role 
of data in educational research, broaching 
questions of objectivity and subjectivity, 
of fact and value. Already this seems too 
much, and so the question arises: where to 
begin? Surely what is needed is a clear pre-
sentation and analysis of the various theo-
retical frameworks and epistemologies 
that are available. So one might think, 
fi rst, in terms of the kinds of theoretical 
framework that might be harnessed to 
this enquiry: positivism, interpretivism, 
symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, 
critical inquiry, feminism, and postmod-
ernism—to give a  reasonably representa-
tive list (see Crotty, 1998). Consideration 
of questions of fact and value must, in 
similar fashion, address directly the vari-
ous positions that are available in episte-
mology, including objectivism, construc-
tivism, and subjectivism. Ideally this 
would extend into the consideration of 
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developments in second generation cog-
nitive science (Lakoff  and Johnson, 1980, 
1999). Moreover, all of these positions ad-
mit variations, and it is surely important 
to be clear about their diff erences. In fact, 
a clear tabulation of these diff erent posi-
tions may help in the mastery of this dif-
fi cult theoretical fi eld and put our enquiry 
onto more secure foundations. All this 
seems indispensable before we address the 
question of the data we are to collect. And 
in fact this last question splits into at least 
two, because there is a preliminary ques-
tion about what is to count as data for our 
research and a subsequent question about 
how we are to address the collection and 
analysis of that data. Th e questions inter-
connect. All-in-all, then, it seems that so 
much work needs to be done before we 
can embark on our project.
Now in a  limited sense this is right. 
As any accomplished researcher knows, 
the idea of simply going out and collect-
ing data makes no sense. “Collect data” or 
“gather evidence” means nothing unless 
we know what kind of data or evidence 
we are looking for, and that depends upon 
what our topic is and the kinds of ques-
tions we are asking. Th is, I take it, is un-
controversial. But to phrase the problem 
thus is to risk missing a more fundamental 
barrier to thinking well. In the complex-
ity of this assembling and classifi cation of 
theories and epistemologies, which is rec-
ommended by most leading handbooks 
on educational research, there is the sem-
blance of a  rational, scientifi c approach, 
and this appears to legitimate what then 
counts as data and the way that data are 
understood. Th is covers over more pro-
found questions, and these need to be ad-
dressed in less technical terms.  
So let us begin again.
DATA APPEAL
Our starting point is data—if, that 
is, data can exactly be a starting-point.1 Is 
anything ever just given? Data can seem 
to be the very foundation of research, the 
sine qua non of enquiry into education. It 
hides also a  certain rhetorical force that 
attaches to data talk. For some researchers 
it is data and its handling that provide the 
very lexicon of their métier, the familiar 
materials of their craft, grist to the mill 
of programs and processes through which 
they have established their expertise and 
position. It becomes diffi  cult to think out-
side its terms. Yet thinking in this way can 
also be troubled by questions about the 
provenance of data or about how some-
thing comes to be constructed as data in 
the fi rst place. And most researchers face 
questions about what to do  with data 
when it arrives—where, in the social sci-
ences more than the physical sciences, re-
sults of tests rarely show conclusively what 
to do next, and where, in light of this, in-
terpretation comes to the fore.
On research methods courses much 
eff ort is devoted to becoming clear about 
1 For a discussion of Wilfred Sellars’ idea of the “myth of the given” and for wider development of this theme, 
see Standish (2001).
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diff erent kinds of data, about how data are 
gathered, and about their appropriateness 
to diff erent research purposes. Th e gather-
ing of data is quite commonly presented 
as an essential basis for enquiry into edu-
cational practice. Indeed, some will claim 
that research without data is simply not 
legitimate.
Perfectly reasonable distinctions are 
drawn early on between quantitative and 
qualitative data, and novice researchers 
are encouraged, whether explicitly or at 
a more tacit level, to identify with one or 
the other approach. In consequence of the 
importance that is attached to researcher 
identity, this division of labour quickly 
becomes ideological (Stone, 2006b). Th e 
ideology is fuelled by various factors. In 
the fi rst place, it is fuelled by the seem-
ingly greater proximity of quantitative 
research to work in the physical sciences, 
under whose shadow social science often 
understands itself. It is in this light that 
ideas of objectivity, validity, and rigour 
tend to be constructed. In the second, 
there is a  corresponding wariness about 
the exercise of judgement and the direct 
consideration of questions of value.  In 
the third, there are the practical benefi ts 
and kudos that attach to winning research 
funding, where quantitative studies tend 
to be larger scale and hence to be awarded 
sums of money that catch the eye. In the 
light of these factors, it is no accident, but 
still a  serious mistake, that the “medical 
model” has become dominant.
Such views are often based on appar-
ently common-sense principles. Th e idea 
that the gathering of data is fundamental 
to research in education is based on the 
view that any form of enquiry and any ar-
gument must rest on foundations. Th ere 
must be a starting point, a rock on which 
to build. Foundational thinking, it may be 
supposed, is necessary for clear thought of 
any kind, and this can be seen in develop-
mental terms. Don’t we learn that 2+2=4 
before we learn more complicated arith-
metic? Don’t we learn to count even be-
fore we learn this? And is it not true of all 
ways of thinking that there must be fi rst 
steps upon which others are built? So our 
route in combating some of the assump-
tions embedded here needs to be more 
indirect. What is at stake can fruitfully 
be approached by way of the problems of 
objectivity and subjectivity, and of fact 
and value. Where does this lead?
Th e idea that the mind is more or less 
separate from the body and the idea that 
there is a  realm of fact distinct from the 
realm of value in many respects laid the 
way for contemporary notions of objec-
tivity and subjectivity, not least in the 
social sciences. Yet both are now widely 
discredited. Th e present argument seeks 
to illustrate the nature of the reappraisal 
that, in consequence, is needed. Th e argu-
ment that unfolds will help to reveal the 
need for a reorientation of education—in 
research, policy, and practice—such that 
the role and importance of the exercise of 
judgement is better understood. Th ere are 
implications here for research methods 
training and for the funding that facili-
tates responsible enquiry into education.
Th e idea that the mind is more or less 
separate from the body, and the “scientifi c” 
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or abstract understanding of the mind that 
this encourages, owes much to the revo-
lutionary thought of Descartes. Th e idea 
that there is a  realm of fact distinct from 
the realm of value is one that the philoso-
phies of David Hume and G.E. Moore 
strongly encouraged. Both ideas laid the 
way for contemporary notions of objectiv-
ity and subjectivity, not least in the social 
sciences, and yet both are now widely dis-
credited.2 Th e present discussion illustrates 
the nature of the reappraisal that, in conse-
quence, is needed.3
PROBLEMS WITH FOUNDATIONS
A problem with foundations, however, 
is where we are to fi nd them, and this has 
been a  source of perplexity through the 
ages—for scientists, historians, philoso-
phers, theologians, and religious believ-
ers. “What is the basis of your claim to 
know?”—this seems like a very reasonable 
question. But what if we cannot answer 
it? Th e worry that there might not be any 
foundation to our claims to knowledge 
has crystallized as the problem of scepti-
cism. Although questions of scepticism 
are, in a sense, as old as human kind, and 
although they are certainly there from the 
beginnings of philosophy, they acquire 
a new and particularly intense expression 
in the work of René Descartes. Th ey be-
come the abiding concern of epistemol-
ogy in the modern era, shaping not only 
its subject-matter but also its methodol-
ogy. Descartes’ innovation was in part 
the adoption of a  method: the method 
of systematic doubt. Th is method pro-
ceeded by rejecting any proposition that 
could be doubted. How do I know there 
is a table in front of me? I have evidence 
from my senses. Yes, but this seems also to 
be the case when I am dreaming. So how 
do  I  know I  am not dreaming. . . How 
do  I  know that there are other people? 
Well, I see them, speak to them. Yes, but 
this also is the case when I am dreaming. 
. . Yet, as is now familiar enough—such 
is the power and infl uence of Descartes’ 
work—I cannot doubt that I  am doubt-
ing: I  cannot doubt that I  am thinking. 
2 Th ere can be something stubbornly persistent about philosophical ideas. Th ey begin in a philosopher’s study but 
then have signifi cance that extends through other fi elds, with trail-eff ects in popular conscientiousness. Descartes’ 
legacy is in part a Cartesianism in the thinking of people who have never heard his name (see Standish, 2012).
3 It goes without saying that the problems identifi ed here do not arise only within the study of education! Th ey 
are there in the social sciences, most obviously, but it is also the case that the development of the physical sci-
ences is less linear and more troubled than is commonly imagined. For example, questions of taxonomy are not 
settled only by the gathering of data but involve the kinds of disputes illustrated by the “lumpers and splitters” 
dichotomy (see Standish, 2017). Paradigm-shifts have often involved a disturbance of the fact/value divide or 
an issue of ontological relativity, and hence the boundary between the physical and the social sciences is in some 
respects more blurred than some have thought. Th is is not to deny the profound diff erence that is identifi ed in, 
for example, Peter Winch’s Th e Idea of a Social Science (1958), to the eff ect that research in the physical sciences is 
conditioned by the vocabulary of the scientist’s discipline, whereas research in social science involves the vocabu-
lary social scientist’s discipline in relation to the self-interpreting vocabulary of the research subjects themselves. 
I set aside here the complexity this occasions.  
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Cogito ergo sum. In a way the signifi cance 
of Descartes’ conclusion is not so much 
in its substance, which has of course been 
challenged in many ways, as in two fur-
ther factors: one is its tacit endorsement of 
the separation of mind and body, which 
later will collude with the rise of science 
in a dualism that has characterized West-
ern thought, surely to its detriment in 
many ways; the other is its underwriting 
of foundationalism, the belief that there 
must be a foundation to our thought.
Th e collusion of Cartesianism with 
the rise of science in the ensuing centu-
ries is surprising in one respect, as will be 
seen, but it can be understood more read-
ily in terms of what we might think of 
as the spectatorial stance.4 Th e spectato-
rial stance is encouraged by, fi rst, the idea 
that fundamentally we are minds with 
a contingent relation to the outside world 
and, second, the practice of examining 
the world through a  lens—most obvi-
ously that of the microscope or telescope. 
Such instruments illustrate the way that 
in scientifi c observation the human be-
ing is distanced from the world. In such 
distancing the sense of sight becomes 
dominant over the other senses. Hence, 
the senses of touch, smell, and hearing 
that normally condition our being in the 
world are suppressed. Whereas these other 
senses are characterized more by ways in 
which we are aff ected in relation to the 
world, the nature of the sense of sight is 
such that it belongs more naturally to our 
deliberate engagement with the world—as 
we turn our head, focus our eyes, fi x our 
gaze. While we cannot close our ears or 
cease to be aff ected by the temperature of 
the room we are in, we can close our eyes.
SUBJECT(IVITY)/OBJECT(IVITY)
Th e kind of physiological shift that is 
described here, with this new prioritiza-
tion of sight and separation of mind and 
body, was accompanied also by changes in 
social structures and diff erent kinds of po-
litical relationship, through which it be-
came increasingly possible to see the hu-
man being as a free agent. Th e individual 
was no longer fi xed in a  social position, 
as in feudal societies; the divine right of 
kings gradually lost infl uence with the rise 
of more democratic forms of association; 
and the authority of the church was partly 
displaced with the new confi dence in hu-
man reason. Charles Taylor identifi es the 
18th century as a crucial period in respect 
of there developing a sense of the human 
being as a  being with inner depths, to 
which reference should be made in de-
terminations of the good (Taylor, 1989, 
1991). If the primary focus of this is in the 
work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, it receives 
4 Of course the story is more complicated than is indicated here. In particular, the understanding of science 
associated with Francis Bacon can be seen to lay the way for the approach to experimentation that rapidly gath-
ered pace (see Smith, 2006). Moreover, it is true also that the development of science over the past one century 
especially has profoundly challenged naïve assumptions about the detachment and neutrality of the “observer”. 
Th is should not be taken, however, as the means to underwrite the subjective relativism that has sometimes come 
to the fore in social science.
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ample elaboration in the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant. Kant’s emphasis on the 
“moral law within” gave impetus to no-
tions of self-rule—that is, the idealization 
of autonomy, a notion that is transferred 
from the political sphere (the autonomy 
of states) to the personal. Th us, there was 
a further strengthening of the sense of the 
contingency of human relations to the 
world.
Taylor revisited the central argument 
of his monumental Sources of the Self 
(1989), in order to present its central ideas 
in more concise form, in his later Th e Ethics
of Authenticity (1991), and reference to 
this can clarify what is being said here. He 
identifi es the way of thinking in question 
as something relatively new and peculiar 
to modern culture. It brings together the 
individualism of disengaged rationality, 
associated with Descartes, with an idea 
of responsibility for oneself, derivative 
of John Locke, in which the individual 
comes to be seen as prior to social obli-
gation. Th is picture is complicated by 
the new legacy of Romanticism, with its 
greater emphasis, in the work of Johann 
Gottfried Herder, for example, on the ties 
of community. While this laid the way 
for contemporary ideas expressed in such 
phrases as “being true to oneself” and 
“self-fulfi lment”, these modern notions of 
freedom came at a price. Th e earlier orders 
of meaning, in which the human being 
found a place, now were eroded in what 
has been called a  process of disenchant-
ment, the benefi ts and costs of which have 
continued to be a matter of debate.5 Th e 
orders Taylor refers to “gave meaning to 
the world and to the activities of social 
life. Th e things that surround us were 
not just potential raw materials or instru-
ments for our projects, but they had the 
signifi cance given them by their place in 
the chain of being. Th e eagle was not just 
another bird, but the king of a whole do-
main of animal life. By the same token, 
the rituals and norms of society had more 
than merely instrumental signifi cance. 
With it, things lost some of their magic” 
(Taylor, 1991, p. 14).
But the in many ways negative eff ects 
of the neutralization of what is outside 
us had the mostly positive correlate of 
this inward turn. Taylor continues: “Th is 
is part of the massive subjective turn of 
modern culture, a  new form of inward-
ness, in which we come to think of our-
selves as beings with inner depths” (p. 37).
One might think of these factors as 
promoting changes of metaphysical and 
ontological kinds. In terms of metaphys-
ics, it is worth considering, for example, 
the way that things become objects, where 
the former term connotes an everyday 
interaction with things, while the lat-
ter, Latinate, and slightly more technical 
term suggests the abstract contemplation 
or instrumentalization of something by 
a detached subject. I make this point with 
reference to English, where diff erences of 
this kind are often related to etymology: 
words drawn from Latin and Greek are 
often more technical, those from northern 
5 For a discussion of disenchantment related more closely to education, see Standish, 2016.
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European roots more domestic and every-
day. As an example, consider the relation-
ship between “handle” and “manipulate”, 
both words refer, literally or metaphori-
cally, to control by the hand: but to say 
of someone that she is good at handling 
people is quite diff erent from saying that 
she is good at manipulating them! Such 
a  diff erence in vocabulary will not of 
course be replicated exactly in other lan-
guages, but the kind of diff erence there is 
between “thing” and “object” can usually 
be found. So what follows from this?
Whereas once the world had been 
thought of as the handiwork, even the 
book, of God, now the world becomes 
neutralized or disenchanted. Whereas 
once, say, in ancient Greece, the world 
(or in a  sense “nature”) was understood 
as dynamic and interwoven with human 
life and meaning, it now becomes a source 
of “raw material” and “natural resources”, 
which fi ts the demands of a more exploit-
ative mode of human being, committed to 
subjugating the earth to its needs. Hence, 
in more ontological terms, the human be-
ing becomes detached from the natural 
world—acting on that world, manipu-
lating it, and controlling it, and progres-
sively out of harmony with it. While there 
is no way to step outside the world and 
outside history in order simply to pass 
judgement on these diff erent ways of be-
ing, it is reasonable to note a  trend that 
was at work that amounts to a kind of er-
ror, for the changes generated a blindness 
to certain eff ects of human action. Th ere 
was a  change in the way human beings 
understood themselves, their relations to 
the environment, and their relations to 
each other, sometimes with dehumaniz-
ing eff ects. We do not need to stand out-
side history in order to see not only con-
sequences in environmental despoliation 
but also a destabilizing or undermining of 
the sense of meaningfulness. Charles Tay-
lor (1989) speaks of the world of medieval 
Europe as a  semiological world—where 
meaning was, as it were, already written 
in, and the question of its value could not 
arise.
It is important that with this change 
to the modern world, this sense of inher-
ent meaning disappears, and the world 
comes to seem neutral and inert. It is 
particularly because of this that the term 
“disenchantment” is apt. It would be ab-
surd, in response to this, to seek a return 
to pre-Renaissance ways of thinking, in 
eff ect to deny the achievements of science. 
Enlightenment is possible, and science is 
a  major factor in its achievement. It is, 
however, possible to recognize a depletion 
in modern world-views, along the lines in-
dicated above.
FACTS AND VALUES
One aspect of that depletion concerns 
the nature of value and its place in the 
world. Th e distancing described above, 
and the neutralizing of the earth as nat-
ural resources have the eff ect of prising 
values and the world apart. With these 
changes there comes also a  separation of 
fact and value. Facts are out there: they 
are found in the everyday deliverances of 
our senses; and they are revealed in greater 
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complexity through the experimental pro-
cedures of science. Values, by contrast, are 
nowhere in evidence. Th ey are nowhere, 
that is, without some addition from hu-
man subjectivity, a conferring of value on 
things in an otherwise inert, meaningless 
world. In light of this, values are taken to 
be primarily “in the mind”. Th ey contrast 
with a world of facts, which is “out there”. 
Th is at least was the assumption that pre-
vailed through much of the modern peri-
od. In some ways it continues to prevail, as 
we shall shortly see. But, fi rst, let us trace 
the way that this view was consolidated.
For a start, it is important to acknowl-
edge that, while the philosophy of Des-
cartes had taken the foundation of reason 
to be within the mind, there was a turn, 
boosted by the rise of science, to the view 
that all our ideas are derived, directly or 
indirectly, from the deliverances of our 
senses—a view found especially in the 
work of Th omas Hobbes (1588–1679) and 
John Locke (1632-1704). In epistemology, 
the former way of thinking is referred to 
as “rationalism” and the latter as “em-
piricism”. While Descartes had in eff ect 
hardened the idea of a mind-body sepa-
ration and an inner-outer divide, Hobbes 
and Locke turned attention more em-
phatically to evidence coming from out-
side.
One classic expression of the relation 
between facts and values, which takes for-
ward these lines of thought, is to be found 
in the Scottish philosopher David Hume’s 
Treatise of Human Nature (1739). Hume 
tries to show what he sees as a  familiar 
problem in reasoning when facts and val-
ues are confused. At fi rst sight, Hume’s 
account has some plausibility to it. You 
think you are discussing something in 
objective terms, and then someone brings 
what are clearly value judgements in, such 
that this seems to stand in the way of a ra-
tional appraisal of the situation. Hume’s 
position was not that we should not dis-
cuss matters of value, and indeed he de-
voted much time to doing so: it was rather 
that the kind of reasoning that was need-
ed for this was of a diff erent order from 
what was needed when discussing, for ex-
ample, the physical properties of things. 
Th e neat slogan that is associated with 
Hume’s view is as follows: “You cannot 
get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.” Th is is open 
to interpretation in various ways, but it is 
usually taken to mean that no evaluative 
conclusion can be drawn from any set of 
purely factual premises: the facts by them-
selves do not tell you what you should do. 
A more recent expression of this position 
is to be found in the work of the early 20th 
century Cambridge philosopher, G.E. 
Moore. Moore argues in his Principia 
Ethica (1903) that if someone confuses 
“good” with any natural object what-
ever, then there is reason for calling that 
the “naturalistic fallacy”. “Natural” here 
would include those physical properties 
of things referred to above, and in general 
would apply to aspects of the world that 
persist regardless of human action. Of 
course, human intervention may change 
the way things are radically, as we see all 
around us, but the changes that are made 
are dependent upon the laws of physics or 
chemistry, for example, and these persist 
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unaff ected by whatever human beings 
happen to do. Th us, the naturalistic fal-
lacy can reasonably be referred to, as we 
saw, as the (supposed) fallacy of inferring 
an “ought” from an “is”.
As already acknowledged, this has 
a  superfi cial plausibility to it. It rightly 
sensitizes us to the fact that sometimes 
people will pass off  their own preferred 
judgement as if this were merely descrip-
tive of the way things are—as if they were 
simply stating matters of fact. Th ere is 
a  surely a duplicity in this, though there 
are still diff erent possibilities here: the 
speaker may be setting out to deceive, 
or they may themselves be in the grip of 
a particular view such that they themselves 
have already been deceived. Th e classic 
use of “ideology” is intended in part to 
imply this second sense—a self-deception 
in which we more or less happily acqui-
esce. So the dangers here are real enough. 
Yet we cannot leave matters as Hume and 
Moore express them. Although this way 
of thinking gained dominance during the 
Modern Period in philosophical thinking, 
and although this then extended through 
other disciplines and came to pervade 
what people took to be common sense, in 
many respects there is reason to call it into 
question.
Let us look more closely at what the 
supposed naturalistic fallacy is. A  text-
book example runs as follows:
 
Torturing cats causes them unnecessary 
pain. (A factual or “is” statement.)
Th erefore, you shouldn’t torture cats.
(A value or “ought” statement.)
According to the naturalistic fallacy, 
this is not valid reasoning. To make it val-
id you need a  further premise (italicized 
below):
Torturing cats causes them unnecessary 
pain. (A factual or “is”-statement.)
You ought not to cause unnecessary pain.
(A general value- or “ought”-statement.)
Th erefore, you shouldn’t torture cats.
(A particular value- or “ought”-statement.)
So the naturalistic fallacy is based on 
the assumption of a  fact/value dichotomy: 
facts are out there in the world; values are 
somehow added to this. Th is encourages 
a  certain conception of objectivity (the 
realm of facts) and subjectivity (the realm 
of values). But look again at the example 
of torturing cats and the explanation of 
the fallacy. 
Torturing cats causes them unnecessary 
pain. Th erefore, you shouldn’t torture 
cats.
Is there anything that can be said 
against this? Th e desire for clarity of 
thought prompts us to seek clear distinc-
tions. Does the distinction between fac-
tual and value statements hold up? Th e fi rst 
statement may well already have caused 
doubts in the minds of some readers, as 
an examination of key terms will quickly 
reveal. Can torture be regarded as value-
free? Torture is commonly thought of as 
an intrinsically bad thing, and hence seen 
in terms of value. Of course it is true that 
arguments can be mustered that purport to 
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justify torture in certain circumstances, so 
the idea that it is intrinsically bad can be 
contested. But what cannot be contested 
is that the very idea of torture necessarily 
involves questions of value. Even if we look 
at the concept in an instrumental way—in 
terms of the torturer’s motivation—it is im-
possible to understand what they are doing 
without some sense of value: they are at-
tempting to force certain secrets out of the 
victim as this will enable them to overpow-
er their enemies or fi nd the treasure or save 
the planet. All these things are plainly mat-
ters of value, which is not to say that their 
value in this case cannot be contested or 
that such values necessarily legitimate tor-
ture as a means to their realization. In fact 
the unavoidable value aspect that we fi nd 
here with the concept of torture extends 
also through other terms in the statement. 
Can we make any sense of pain without 
the notion that it is unpleasant? “Unneces-
sary” already implies something negative 
and, when coupled with a  negative word 
(“pain”), something undesirable. Indeed, 
the sentence is something of a tautology in 
that the concepts in question are built into 
the notion of torture. Torture is the infl ic-
tion of pain. Its lack of necessity might be 
contrasted with what one experiences occa-
sionally at the hands of the dentist.
Th e point being made here comes 
over in a  still more telling way when we 
think of cats themselves. What is a  cat? 
Of course one can step out of ordinary life 
and provide the kind of defi nition that 
zoology might off er. But that approach 
to the animal typically comes—and must 
necessarily come—after some more every-
day experience of cats or relationship to 
and understanding of animal life. It may 
be the case that we have grown up in a cul-
ture where cats are treated as pets, where 
they are stroked, where they drink milk, 
and so on. Another culture might treat 
them as vermin and chase them away or 
kill them. But these are all matters of val-
ue. What is not really conceivable is that 
our relationship to cats could be without 
this, any more than could our relationship 
to rats. Even if one takes an animal that 
fi gures less prominently in human experi-
ence, the very fact that it is understood as 
animal, as a sentient being, already places 
it within the realm of value. 
In the light of this it perhaps comes 
to seem that, far from facts and values 
belonging to distinct realms, values go 
“all the way down”. Th is, at least, has be-
come a common way of putting it, and it 
is a view that has been increasingly widely 
accepted over the past century.6
6 Th e story being told here is broad-brushed, and other lines through the literature might have been taken up. 
Within the early modern period there is a line of thought that derives from Baruch Spinosa that plainly opens 
towards a diff erent metaphysics. Indeed, it is opposed to both rationalism and empiricism, as defi ned here, and 
Spinosa’s work constitutes an early insight into the fact that these apparently opposite positions in epistemol-
ogy are in some degree steeped in a similar metaphysics. Th e rise of American philosophy and pragmatism, as 
well as the acknowledgement of Eastern ways of thinking has helped to undermine this. Within this story, John 
Dewey off ers a powerful and subtle critique, which is of obvious importance for education. Th e earlier thought of 
Emerson and Th oreau provides a departure from the European inheritance and anticipates by a century some of 
the insights of Heidegger and poststructuralism.
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We can still, however, imagine some-
one raising an objection along the follow-
ing lines: “Surely,” they might say, “there 
are at least some factual statements that 
are value free. For example, oak trees have 
green leaves. Iron is a metal. . . Th ese seem 
purely factual and free from value judge-
ments.” At fi rst sight, the objection seems 
plausible enough. Surely these are just 
matters of fact. But these facts are related 
to, and indeed incorporate, values to the 
extent that they would never have been 
identifi ed if they did not in some way 
relate to human purposes (which are, of 
course, matters of value). What, after all, 
is a tree? Like the cat, the tree can be stud-
ied in purely scientifi c terms, as an aspect 
of biology. But again this presupposes 
a  background of ordinary experience of 
trees. Such a  background is not hard to 
imagine, because human beings typically 
encounter trees quite early in their lives, 
and trees fi gure in human experience in 
a variety of meaningful ways. For a start 
their size, relative to the human body, 
means that they are readily noticeable: 
we can climb them, shelter under them, 
take wood from them, and perhaps eat 
their fruit. Hence they are encountered in 
a way that is already structured by human 
purposes.
Yet surely, our interlocutor may protest, 
trees have existed for far longer than hu-
man beings, so they cannot be dependent 
upon human purposes in this way. Th e fi rst 
part of this objection is obviously correct, 
but the second part should give us pause. 
Th e crucial point here is that it brings us 
to a kind of impasse. We have ample evi-
dence that trees existed before there were 
human beings, but that evidence is pro-
duced through forms of enquiry that derive 
from our ordinary practices of living in the 
world. Even the correct application of the 
terms—in “trees have existed for far longer 
than human beings”—derives from and 
depends upon this everyday experience. 
Our more abstract forms of enquiry ride 
on the back of this ordinary experience of 
the world. Th e ordinary phenomenal world 
cannot be expunged from them. Th ere is 
a  kind of anthropomorphism in imagin-
ing the world before there was any human 
life, for we inevitably picture it from the 
perspective of the embodied human con-
dition, with the characteristic fi t between 
human organs of perception and the aff or-
dances of things. In other words, trees show 
up as big (in relation to human height), 
as sturdy (because we can climb them or 
build things with their wood), and as bear-
ing green leaves (where greenness depends 
in part upon the physiology of the human 
eye).  If our senses were diff erent, the world 
would not appear the same; if we had no 
senses, it would not come to light at all. If 
we were all-seeing like God . . .—well, that 
is inconceivable: to speak of what it would 
look like is meaningless, because the very 
notion of how something looks is already 
dependent upon the ordinary, partial per-
ception of human beings. On the strength 
of our ordinary seeing, we can perhaps try 
to imagine how the world looks to spiders, 
and possibly ingeniously constructed lenses 
could give us visual experience of some-
thing like this, but seeing “everything” is 
inconceivable.  In fact, the world in its most 
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general and basic sense seems already to be 
characterized in terms of this human per-
spective. To repeat, we can abstract from 
this experience in order to view an aspect of 
the world in more scientifi c terms, and en-
quiry of this sort is of immense importance 
and value. But even the terms of science, its 
aim of the better understanding of things, 
do not make sense it if is not allowed that 
this is somehow desirable, as the word “bet-
ter” indicates. So, once again, we can see 
that even where our thinking is most ob-
jectively and apparently neutrally refi ned, 
there is still this valuational dimension. 
What else is the value of objectivity?
CRITERIA AND THE EVASION 
OF VALUE
In the light of this argument, the idea 
that objectivity relates to the realm of 
facts and subjectivity to the realm of val-
ues is thoroughly discredited. It fact it is 
a dangerous idea. During the fi rst half of 
the 20th century, partly through the work 
of the Vienna Circle, logical positivism 
became dominant in philosophy, and its 
ways spread through other disciplines and 
into ordinary discourse. Hilary Putnam 
describes its infl uence on economics in 
the middle decades of the century, with 
reference especially to Lionel Robbins 
(Putnam, 2012). Robbins had defi ned 
economics as “the science which studies 
human behavior as a relationship between 
given ends and scarce means which have 
alternative uses” (Robbins, 1932, p.  16). 
He drew a clear distinction between “pos-
itive” and “normative” matters, arguing 
that the economist must study the for-
mer—what is, not what ought to be; and 
he saw economics as a  system of logical 
deduction from fi rst principles. Robbins 
advised governments through the time of 
the Depression, and so his views aff ected 
the lives of millions of people. Yet what 
can economic principles be if they are 
not already bound up with what is good 
for human beings, which is manifestly 
a  question of value? Robbins and many 
other economists after him—he was close 
to the Austrian economist, Friedrich 
Hayek, whose thought was to become so 
infl uential with the emphasis on free mar-
ket economics later in the century—have 
pushed this question conveniently aside.7 
Examples of this supposed side-step-
ping of questions of value are evident 
enough in educational research, and their 
characteristic contemporary formula-
tion is captured in the familiar enough 
phrase: “What works best?” What works 
best in teaching children to read? What 
is the best way to learn mathematics? Th e 
very idea of what-works-best has no sense, 
however, unless it is clear what one is try-
ing to do. What exactly is reading? What 
aspects of reading matter most? And what 
kinds of mathematics is it best to learn? 
Th ese questions are head-on values ques-
tions, and they deserve careful attention. 
Reference to test scores in comparative 
7 Of course it is along these lines that criticism of neoliberal educational policy and practice can and has been de-
veloped. See, for example, Blake et al. (1998a, 1998b, 2000). For a critique of educational research in neoliberal 
times, see Standish (1995, 2014). 
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studies is a way of seeming to provide “ob-
jective” data, but in fact in the absence of 
consideration for what the point of learn-
ing mathematics is (both in general terms 
and with these children at this time), this is 
likely to lead to lack of clarity if not out-
right delusion about what is going on.
Moreover, it is not as though better 
practice here would simply involve de-
termining the ends and then fi nding the 
most effi  cient means. Such an approach is 
found in attempts to plan the curriculum 
through the clear specifi cation of aims, 
with statements of objectives derived from 
this and descriptions of learning outcomes 
purporting to test that these objectives 
have been achieved. Th e obvious attrac-
tions of this way of thinking are its tidi-
ness, and in many walks of life this would 
be reasonable enough. One might run an 
effi  cient factory this way. Th e dangers here 
are most acute for education when there 
is an attempt to specify each of these lev-
els of description exhaustively. Th is yields 
a  means of effi  cient accounting, where 
each stage in the process can be eff ectively 
monitored and performance accurately 
measured. But there is nothing here to 
provide assurance that what is accounted 
for is what counts. To understand what 
counts, a more rigorous sensitivity to the 
dynamics of teaching and learning is re-
quired, as well as awareness of the dynam-
ics inherent in a  subject—and awareness 
of the ways that the former inheres in the 
latter. Inverted commas around "criteria" 
are warranted because the term has be-
come a technical one—in policy, curricu-
lum planning, the practice of teaching, 
and assessment. “Criteria” have come to 
be understood as more or less behavioural 
descriptors in numbered check-lists. In the 
absence of such lists, there are no criteria! 
But this fl ies in the face of the ways that 
criteria inhere in all practices. A criterion 
is a  standard according to which things 
are judged to be done better or worse, or 
appropriately or inappropriately; and this 
is internal to the very idea of a practice, 
to the kinds of things that human beings 
do. Criteria sometimes need to be made 
explicit, but for the most part they do not. 
Th ere are criteria for sitting on a chair: this 
is something we do not do naturally but 
learn, and at various points our behaviour 
has probably been corrected, according 
to the social and cultural circumstances. 
So much is learned without the need for 
anyone to spell this out. Th e same thing 
applies in the study of a subject. What it 
is to study history or mathematics will not 
depend upon an exhaustive list of criteria 
but rather on certain norms of procedure, 
of approach and purpose and argument 
and attitude, and these will be passed on 
in good teaching without their being made 
explicit. Indeed the idea that this could all 
be made explicit is very implausible—in 
fact, downright confused. None of this is 
to deny the value of being explicit about 
certain criteria, and plainly this can be 
useful in determining grade levels when 
assessing students. But for the most part 
such criteria, if they are to avoid becoming 
crudely behaviouristic, will stand in need 
of interpretation by teachers and examin-
ers, where interpretation is a  matter not 
of the teacher exercising her judgement 
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at whim but rather of her off ering reasons 
for her judgement, comparing and align-
ing these with those of other practitioners, 
and developing consistencies of standard 
over time.
JUDGEMENT AND THE ROLE 
OF THE HUMANITIES
Th is last point is especially important 
because it provides a  practical example 
of the kinds of things that good teachers 
do  in which their judgement is at stake, 
and it hammers home the point that 
judgement of this kind is not “merely sub-
jective” or simply “personal”. Th e teacher 
off ers her judgement and attempts to give 
reasons as to why this student’s work is 
better than that student’s. Her reasons are 
then weighed against the judgements of 
others. Further reasons are given. Judge-
ments are refi ned—not merely averaged 
out but refi ned in the light of argument. 
Th rough discussion a  fi nal judgement is 
achieved, and ideally all this is moderated 
by an outsider, with experience of similar 
courses and where the same standards 
should obtain. Indeed, it is through conti-
nuities of practice like this, across institu-
tions and over time, that subjects of study 
are sustained. By contrast, practitioners 
and researchers can be mesmerized by too 
much reliance on data, so that the very 
sense of what they are trying to research 
falls out of the picture, with bogus con-
ceptions of objectivity and rigour usurp-
ing the values that should be sustained 
and undermining the objectivity to which 
good judgement can lead.
What I  have tried to show is that 
educational practice and research would 
benefi t from a more accurate sense of ob-
jectivity and subjectivity. Crucially this 
will move to centre stage the importance 
of judgement in education. Teachers need 
to be prepared in a  way insists in them
a realization of the necessity of the exer-
cise of judgement, and in a way that gives 
them growing confi dence in this. Th at 
judgement will never be “merely subjec-
tive”. It must be exposed to and respon-
sive to the views of others, and at times 
at least it will be appropriate for it to be 
substantiated with reasons. It is important 
that the teacher does not see this simply as 
a technical exercise, as if the learner were 
to be measured against a  predetermined 
scale, as one measures a length with a rule. 
It is desirable, even necessary that she be 
subjectively engaged in this—that is, 
caught up in the practice so that getting it 
right matters to her, where it matters not 
because of pressures from an inspection 
regime but because of the goods inher-
ent in education that she is committed to 
passing on.
Educational research, for its part, can-
not rely on data alone. Some of its most 
important tasks do not involve the gather-
ing of evidence but rather the direct con-
sideration of questions of value and jus-
tifi cation. Indeed what could “evidence” 
mean without some prior conception of 
the value in what is being researched? How 
could a research project legitimately begin 
without some prior sense of the purpose 
of what one is doing—that is, of why it 
matters and whether one has thought this 
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through well? Th ere are implications here 
not only for research methods training8 
but also for the substance of research and 
for the funding that facilitates responsible 
enquiry into education.9
Th e argument of this paper points 
towards the need for a  reappraisal of the 
ways that educational research is under-
stood. It implies the need for renewed 
recognition of the importance of the 
humanities in enquiry into educational 
policy and practice. Th e predominance of 
scientifi c method in the understanding of 
educational research—and, that is, in its 
self-conception—is itself the refl ection of 
the encroachments of scientism. Th e sci-
ences and the humanities are not in com-
petition. Both are needed. Hence, this is 
not fundamentally to enter into a territo-
rial dispute, nor to claim some questions 
as the exclusive preserve of philosophers. It 
is a question of the logic of enquiry. What 
the humanities provide above all, however, 
is the means for enquiry into the value and 
purposes of education, including ques-
tions about the value of science itself. Such 
questions of value are not to be addressed 
by refi nements in scientifi c method.
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